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ABSTRACT
This paper describes an analysis of the level of 
redundancy of line repaceable units (LRUs) re­ 
quired for the Space Shuttle avionics system. The 
required number of LRUs is neither based on an 
arbitrary numerical probability nor on an arib- 
trary number of replicative units. Instead, a 
total cost to the program of each added LRU is 
calculated and the configuration that results in 
lowest program cost is selected.
The analysis includes the costs of developing and 
procuring hardware, and the annual maintenance 
expense. Cost penalties for weight and electric 
power consumption are imposed for each added 
LRU. Improvement in reliability is quantified 
in terms of the reduced costs due to fewer lost 
vehicles and fewer missions where the payload 
cannot be delivered. Realistic mission rules are 
used for determining when the payload cannot be 
safely delivered. The analysis allows a choice of 
high-reliability or low-reliability procurement 
policies for each LRU.
The results show that triply redundant Booster 
equipment and triply-redundant Orbiter equipment, 
are most cost effective, except for one additional 
inertial platform and central computer in the 
Orbiter.
1.0 INTRODUCTION
This report summarizes the analytic portion of a 
redundancy study performed for the avionics sys­ 
tem as part of the Space Shuttle Phase B contract.
Redundancy is usually specified in either of two 
ways:
a) Specify the probability of successfully com­ 
pleting the mission and the probability of safe 
return. Redundancy of the equipment is then 
selected as necessary to meet the reliability 
goals.
b) Specify the level of redundancy, directly, such 
as the "no single-point-failure" rule of Apollo 
or the "fail-operational after the two most 
critical failures, fail-safe after the third 
(FO/FO/FSy rule specified by NASA in the ' 
Phase B work statement.
Neither specification method is wholly satisfactory 
because costs are not taken into consideration. 
Some method that selects redundancy levels
considering both reliability data and cost data is 
needed. This can be done by summing failure 
penalty costs, which decrease as redundancy in­ 
creases, with initial and support costs, which in­ 
crease as redundancy increases. This sum is 
called the Figure-Of-Merit Cost. This paper de­ 
scribes a method of redundancy selection by min­ 
imizing Figure-Of-Merit Cost. In order to make 
the method as general as possible, weight and 
energy penalties were included in the Figure-Of - 
Merit Cost. This method provides a procedure for 
identifying exceptions to the FO/FO/FS rule and 
for specifying numerical probabilities of System 
Safety and Success.
A computer program was developed that accepts 
cost and reliability data for the LRUs, and the 
mission parameters discussed in Section 2. It 
determines the redundancy level that minimizes 
the Figure-Of-Merit Cost, and calculates Buy-In 
Cost and the probabilities of safe return and of 
payload delivery. The program can also be used 
to evaluate the effect of operational parameters 
and design decisions on redundancy, reliability, 
and cost.
Many assumptions were made in order to apply 
this method of analysis to the shuttle. The as­ 
sumptions were based on available data during 
Phase B and can be improved as the project con­ 
tinues. The computer program was designed to 
permit all parameters to be readily changed.
The next section describes the particular shuttle 
mission for which results are reported in this 
paper. It includes a discussion of the reliability 
model. Section 3 describes those aspects of the 
avionic system design that are pertinent to this 
study. Section 4 presents the cost model and the 
values of some of the cost parameters. Section 5 
discusses the computer program and Section 6 
summarizes the principal results. Sections 7 and 
8 contain conclusions and acknowledgements.
2.0 MISSION DESCRIPTION
2. 1 Mission Phases
The Space Shuttle has three types of mission:
a) Deliver or retrieve satellites
b) Conduct experiments while in orbit
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c) Re supply a space station
The space station re supply mission is the one anal­ 
yzed in this paper. The Booster launches both ve­ 
hicles, separates, and returns to the launch site. 
The Orbiter continues into orbit, effects a ren­ 
dezvous with the station and remains inertly dock­ 
ed. After approximately 6 days, the Orbiter un- 
docks and returns to the launch site. The Orbiter 
and Booster flight profiles are shown in Tables 1 
and 2. Flight phases during which switching tran­ 
sients are not tolerable are identified. For the 
Orbiter, the 12 hour ascent time is typical of an 
Apollo-type concentric flight plan. The nominal 
descent time is 4 hours. Studies were made of 
worst-case 24 hour returns and showed little dif­ 
ference from the results reported here.
Pre-launch and ground phases are not considered 
except to assume one ground failure per flight 
failure.
2. 2 K Factors
The actual duration of each phase is multiplied by 
a k factor to produce an effective duration repre­ 
senting the environmental severity of each phase. 
Different k factors are used to allow for differing 
vibrational and thermal environments at various 
locations in the vehicle. In addition to the varia­ 
tion of k factors due to mission phase and location, 
the k factor depends on the type of LRU and its 
utilization. For each of 4 categories of LRU, 
factors are assigned depending on whether the 
equipment is off or on. The k factors range from 
0. i for unpowered electromechanical equipment in 
a non-vibrational environment to 500 for operating 
electromechanical equipment in a high-vibration 
environm ent.
Two effective mission durations are calculated for 
each LRU. One LRU of each redundant group is 
on at all times. The other LRUs are off except in 
critical phases when switching transients cannot 
be tolerated. These utilizations by mission phases 
are also used to calculate the amount of electrical 
energy consumed by each LRU.
2. 3 Reliability Model
In order to calculate the role of each LRU in the 
total reliability, a reliability block diagram was 
made. Each function (e. g. , communication) re­ 
quired for mission success was assigned its own 
Series Block, which contained all LRUs required 
to perform the function. Thus, if two or more 
LRU types are redundant to one another, then they 
must be considered together in a single Series 
Block, The product of all Series Block reliabili­ 
ties gives the probability of mission success.
The minimum requirement for a successful mis* 
sion is that the payload be delivered to the station
and that crew and vehicle return safely to the 
primary landing site. A safe mission is identified
as any mission in which crew and vehicle return 
safely to any approved shuttle landing site. Each 
LRU is identified as required either for safety or 
for success. For example, rendezvous aids are
required for success whereas the central com­ 
puters, navigation aids, and flight control actuators 
are for safety. Communications are considered to 
be required for safety in order to permit diversion 
from a bad weather airport since neither vehicle 
can hold and fly to an alternate field.
Exponentially distributed times to failure, i, e, , 
constant failure rates, were used for all LRUs. 
This condition is approached more and more close­ 
ly as (1) infant mortality failures are removed by 
procurement screening and/or burn-in; and (2) 
wear-out failures are avoided by effective preven­ 
tive maintenance.
The expected number of failures per flight of each 
LRU is found by dividing the corresponding effec­ 
tive durations by the LRU's MTBF. These values 
are used in standby redundancy formulas to cal­ 
culate reliabilities. This is an approximation, but 
a very close one based on past experience.
2.4 Mission Outcomes
Four possible mission outcomes are recognized in 
this analysis:
a) Nominal or successful mission (no abort, no 
loss).
b) Payload not delivered but no vehicle loss 
(abort, no loss).
c) Payload delivered, but vehicle lost during 
return flight (no abort, loss).
d) Vehicle lost prior to payload delivery (abort, 
loss).
A mission must be reflown if either outcome 2 or 
4 occurs. The vehicle is lost if either outcome 3 
or 4 occurs.
Some mission phases are omitted for an Orbiter 
which cannot deliver its payload due to early fail­ 
ures, see Figure 1. For the Orbiter, a decision 
that the payload cannot be delivered is possible up 
to the end of the docking phase and is not made un­ 
til that point. If the payload is not delivered, the 
Orbiter immediately starts to return, beginning at 
the phase just after undo eking and proceeding 
through the rest of the nominal mission. For the 
Booster, failures that would prevent the Orbiter 
from delivering the payload can occur only during 
boost, and a Booster abort continues with the same 
mission profile as a nominal mission.
Jf all Orbiter LRUs for a given success Series 
Block fail prior to docking, the payload is not de­ 
livered. This payload is also undelivered if only 
1 or 2 (an input variable to the computer program) 
LRUs of a safety Series Block remain.
3. 0 DESCRIPTION OF AVIONICS
The functions of the avionics are;
1) Traditional functions such as navigation,, guid- - 
ance and communication
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2) Provide a data transmission and data process­ 
ing service for control and checkout of vehicle 
systems.
Because communication between the avionics 
equipment is via the computer-controlled data 
buses, the computers and bus components are re­ 
quired for flight safety. The bus structure is such 
that any LRU can be operated at the same time as 
any other LRU. The power distribution system 
was not included in this study.
The study modeled the failure detection capabili­ 
ties of the avionics system. When three or more 
redundant LRUs are on, failure detection is by 
comparison in the central computers. When two 
LRUs of a redundant group remain, failure detec­ 
tion relies more heavily upon built-in test within 
each LRU. This study assumed that the built-in 
test could identify 90% to 100% of the LRU failures, 
a fraction that can be chosen independently for 
each LRU (see Table 3).
4.0 COST PARAMETERS 
4. 1 Buy-In Cost
The Out-of-Pocket or Buy-In Cost of the shuttle 
avionics is defined as the initial investment in 
avionics hardware prior to the first operational 
flight. It is expressed as follows for each vehicle:
Buy-In Cost = 1/2 (Development Cost) + 
(Cost per Shipset) (N+3) + 
5 (Cost per LRU)
where half of the development cost is charged to 
the Booster and half to the Orbiter, and where N 
is the number of operational vehicles. Two extra 
ship sets are required during the flight test pro­ 
gram, a third shipset of spares is needed, and 10 
LRU sets (5 for the Orbiter and 5 for the Booster) 
are used in ground testing. A shipset consists of 
1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 LRUs of a given type depending 
on the level of redundancy.
4.2 Figure-Of-Merit Cost
The Figure-of-Merit Cost is a measure of the ten- 
year program cost. It consists of the Buy-In Cost 
plus support costs plus a penalty cost for failures. 
The Figure-of-Merit Cost includes all costs that 
vary with redundancy.
4. 2. 1 Support Costs 
Support costs are:
a) Weight penalty = 5.8 K$/lb for the Booster
16 K$/lb for the Orbiter
This penalty is uniformly distributed over the 
life of the shuttle. The values are based on a 
445 flight program.
b) Electric energy penalty = $ 17/kilowatthour 
for Orbiter or 
Booster
This penalty is uniformly distributed over the 
life of the shuttle. The values are based on a 
445 flight program.
c) Maintenance costs - These consist of repair 
and replacement costs and are proportional to 
the average number of failures per flight. It 
was assumed that one false-alarm removal 
occurs for every genuine failure. Repairs and 
replacements were assumed to occur at a uni­ 
form rate during the program.
d) Cost of replacing worn-out equipment. Cer­ 
tain LRUs were assigned a wear out life, see 
Table 3.
The significant factors determining support costs 
of each LRU type for the results reported later 
are shown in Table 3, along with LRU procurement 
costs. These values are typical and do not neces­ 
sarily represent the latest estimates. They pre­ 
suppose an Apollo or high reliability procurement 
policy. In order to assess the effects of a different 
procurement policy, all LRU MTBF's were reduced 
by 80% and all LRU costs by 50%. The impact of 
this "commercial parts" policy is discussed in 
Section 6,
4. 2. 2 Failure Penalty Costs
A cost penalty was assessed for failure to deliver 
the payload and for vehicle loss. Section 2.4 
shows the four possible outcomes of a mission. A 
successful mission has no failure cost. The cost 
of re-flying a mission (outcome 2 or 4) is 3. 15 
million dollars (including 1% amortization, plus 
range support costs). The cost of a lost vehicle 
and crew was estimated at 120, 130, and 225 
million dollars for Booster, Orbiter, and both ve­ 
hicles, respectively. This penalty includes half 
the original cost of the vehicle, and allowances 
for passenger insurance, crew retraining, cargo, 
and investigations. No quantitative value was at­ 
tached to the loss of human lives.
The expected failure cost on any flight is:
Failure Cost = (Reflown Mission) (Probability 
that Mission must be Reflown) 
+ (Lost Vehicle Cost) (Prob­ 
ability of Lost Vehicle)
4. 3 Time Distribution of Costs
All costs incurred prior to the first operational 
flight are referenced to an initial time two years 
prior to the first operational flight. All future 
costs are converted into their present value at the 
initial time at 10% interest per annum. In order 
to do this, their ten-year sum is multiplied by 
0,46 (an input quantity to the computer program). 
By varying the interest rate in the analysis, the
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relative weighting between initial coats and der- 
red costs can be varied.
5. 0 COMPUTER PROGRAM
The analysis approach outlined in previous sec­ 
tions was formalized mathematically and coded in 
Fortran IV for TRW's time-shared CDC-6500, 
The program requires about 19* 000 words of core, 
of which 4, 100 words are overlaid twice during the 
course of a run. It uses 15 seconds of CPU time 
for the Booster case; and. 22 seconds for 'the Orbit­ 
er, with its larger number of mission phases and 
larger number of LRUs*
The principal inputs to a run of this program are:
• Mission 'phase durations
• K factors, by phase* LRU location, and 
.JLR.U utilization (on or off)
• Cost penalties for
• Reflowii mission
• Lost vehicle
• Weight
*
• Energy
• Reliability model
• Number of good safety ,LRUs required to 
continue with payload delivery
data as in Table 3
• Interest rate, for discounting .future costs 
The pxincfyal outputs of a computer run are;
• Buy-In and Figure-of-Merit Costs, for 
various equipment complements
« Probabilities of the four mission outcomes
• Equipment complement that gives minimum 
Figure -of-Merit Cost
• " Sensitivity of Figure-of-Merit Cost to 
certain changes in the equipment comple­ 
ment
6.0 RESULTS
The results show the Figure* of-Merit Cost and 'the 
Buy-In Cost for a variety of different design pa­ 
rameters. Figures 2 to 4 show these costs as a 
function of equipment redundancy levels. Varying 
the minimum number of safety LRUs required to 
continue with, payload delivery, the number of ve­ 
hicles, mad the operating time causes little change 
in the shape of the curves, though 'the absolute 
level of the curves changes*
Figure 2 shows the results for the Orbiter, assum­ 
ing that the vehicle starts home, without deliver­ 
ing its payload, when only one of a. safety type re­ 
mains. The curve for Apollo-quality parts shows 
that levels of redundancy below 3 cause a rapidly 
increasing penalty, due to a. rapidly increasing 
probability of a lost vehicle and crew. However,
3 sheets, FO/FO/FS, 4 sheets, and the optimum 
all give about the same Figure-of-Merit Cost.
The Buy-In Cost of the optimum and of the 3 sheet 
designs are equal, and are about 10% cheaper than 
FO/FO/FS and 4 sheet designs, which also are 
equal. The Orbiter high-reliability optimum, 
while mainly a 3 sheet design, calls for 4 IMUs and
4 central computers and 2 or fewer of all mission 
success LRUs.
The Booster results are plotted in Figure 3 for the 
same conditions as Figure 29 For high reliability 
parts, the 3 sheet and optimum designs coincide 
and are 10% cheaper in Buy -In Cost than are the 
FO/FO/FS and 4 sheet designs, which also coin­ 
cide. Three IMUs and 3 central computers are 
selected. Even though the optimum Booster design 
is slightly less redundant than the optimum Orbiter 
design, the probability of losing a vehicle and crew 
is about 3 times higher for the Orbiter (0.00014 
versus 0.000043 for the Booster). These differ­ 
ences are a result of the effective mission dura­ 
tion being 27 hours for the Booster and 139 hours 
for the Orbiter.
If the Orbiter crew's rule is to start home without 
having delivered the payload when 2 sheets remain 
instead of when 1 sheet remains, the probability
of no payload delivery increases and the prob­ 
ability of crew safety also increases, as shown m
Figure 4. Also, the high-reliability optimum 
moves to a generally higher level of redundancy.
Figures Z and 3 also plot the results when commer­ 
cial reliability parts are used. The Buy-In Cost of
the Orbiter 1 s commercial reliability optimum is 
50% less than its high-reliability optimum (about 
70 million dollars less). This may be an attractive 
feature despite the Figure-of-Merit Cost being 50% 
worse. The Buy-In Cost of the commercial reli­ 
ability optimum Booster design is also about 50% 
less (55 million dollars less) than its high-reli­ 
ability optimum, but in addition it offers a 90 
million dollar reduction in Figure-of-Merit Cost.
The sensitivities of the optimum designs to a 
change in one LRU at a time from the optimum re­ 
dundancy level to the next best alternative were 
also calculated. The percent rise in the Figure - 
of-Merit Cost is small, the largest being about 3% 
(this can represent total program cost increases 
of 4 or 5 million dollars).
7.0 CONCLUSIONS
The results show that NASA's FO/FO/FS .guide­ 
line is very close to the optimum-cost design, 
though deviations for certain LRUs were found to 
be cost effective. For some LRUs, commercial 
equipment may be cost effective,-particularly in
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the Booster,
As the shuttle program progresses, it is necessary 
to update the values of costs and MTBF for the 
LRUs. It is desirable to recalculate the probabili­ 
ties of success and safety from time to time and to 
investigate their sensitivities to redundancy, time- 
line and operating rules. This computer program 
is a tool for analyzing changes quickly, and for 
examining their effects on program cost.
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Table L Booster Mission Phases
Duration
Phase (Hours: Minutes)
1. Boost 0:03. 5
2. Separate 0:00. 06
3. Coast to Apogee 0:01. 1
4. Maximum Lift 0:00. 8
5. Maximum Deceleration 0:03.4
6. Aerodynamic Turn, „ 0:03. 4
7. Glide 0:06.7
8. Cruise 1:32
9. Approach 0:05
10. Roll-out 0:01
All phases of Booster flight require transientless switching.
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Table 2. Orbiter Mission Phases
1.
z.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
Y:
N:
Phase
Boost
Separate
Burn
Coast
Burns
Coast
Rendezvous
Dock
Docked, Power Off
Docked, Checkout
Undock and Separate
Burns
Coast
Entry
Transition
Cruise
Approach
Land
Yes
No
Duration
(Hours: Minutes) 
0:03. 5
0:00. 06
0:03. Z
0:36
0:48
12:00
1:15
0:08
144:06
2:00
0:08
0:27
4:00
0:44
0:01. 3
0:04. 6
0:08.4
0:05
Criticality: 
Switching 
Transients
Allowable
N
N
N
Y
N
Y
N
N
-
Y
N
N
Y
N
N
N
N
N
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Table 3. LRU Data
O
CO
K. fl£ «>t> "
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X
X 
X
X 
X
X
X
X 
X 
X
LRU Name
IMU, Gimballed
Star Tracker
Stab. Aug. Sys. Elec.
Horizon Sensor
ACS /QMS Elec. , Fwd.
ACS /QMS Elec. , Aft
Static Press. Sensors
Jet Engine Throttle
Control Stick
Rudder /Brake Pdls
Rate Gyro Package
TVC Electronics
Tot. Temp. + Prsr. Sensors
SCU
Central Computer
ADI (attitude Dir. Indicator)
ILS Receiver (GS/Loc)
DME Receiver
VOR Receiver
Radar Altimeter
UHF Transceiver
Display, Sym. Generator
Attitude Hand Controller
Accel. Pkg (Fit. Ctl)
Keyboard
Display Crt
INS DIU
Transltn Hand Ctl
S-Band Ranging
S-Band Transceiver
MTBF
(KHR)
3
12
10
20
65
65
50
20
20
20
13
10
50
22
1
3
40
40
40
10
40
1
20
8
10
2
60
20
20
69
Proc.***
Cost
(Kg)
175. 0
200. 0
150. 0
200. 0
7. 5
7. 5
25. 0
20. 0
6. 3
12. 5
80. 0
80. 0
25. 0
40. 0
750. 0
100. 0
25. 0
70. 0
175. 0
70. 0
100. 0
280. 0
175. 0
100. 0
50. 0
120. 0
50. 0
125. 0
40. 0
200. 0
Wt.
(libs. )
60. 0
47.0
12.0
10. 0
10. 0
10. 0
2. 5
20. 0
25. 0
20. 0
4. 0
8. 5
2. 5
7. 0
75. 0
11. 0
11. 0
30. 0
10. 0
21. 0
30.0
32. 0
15. 0
1. 5
3. 0
34.0
5.0
7. 0
7. 0
14.2
No. of
Flights
To Wearout
40 (gyros)
75
148*
40
148
148
148
148
148
148
80
148
148
148
148
100
148
148
148
148
148
148
148
148
148
40
148
148
148
148
Failure**
Detection
Probability
.95
.99
.95
.98
1. 0
1. 0
1. 0
1. 0
1. 0
.95
.90
.95
1. 0
.99
.99
1. 0
.95
.95
.95
.95
1. 0
1. 0
1. 0
.90
1. 0
1. 0
.95
1. 0
1. 0
1. 0
**
Maximum value allowed = 445 flights/ 3 vehicles
Probability that vehicle is not immediately lost if next to last LRU fails.
]?or most LRUs, repair cost was taken as 10% of procurement cost, and 
replacement cost was taken as 5% of procurement cost.
Booster Events: Liftoff 
Orbiter Events: Liftoff
r
Dock
Separate -,
Undock
Land 
Land
Deliver 
Payload?
Figure 1. Mission Profile Possibilities
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